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Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution:

The Theory

By ALFRED G. CUZÁN

ABSTRACT. A resource mobilization-political opportunities paradigm of *revolution* in the *Third World* yields the hypotheses: Sufficient *poverty*, corruption, and social, economic, and political inequalities, grievances and discontent are assumed to exist in most Third World *autocracies* to legitimate violent revolution. Yet, revolution is rare, having more to do with resources, organization, strategy, and opportunities than with generalized discontent. The following factors stand out: an expanding middle class, growing university enrollments, and urbanization; the existence of an internationally assisted revolutionary organization with leadership steeped in militant ideology; and a regime unable or unwilling to resort to large-scale repression, or which fails to respond early and decisively to revolutionary challenges. One such factor describes Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, plus the know-how for "stealing" a revolution. A subsequent article tests these generalizations regarding the Nicaraguan revolution.

I

Introduction

SOCIOLOGISTS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS in the last two decades developed two closely related approaches to the study of social movements, the resource mobilization paradigm, and the political opportunities paradigm.¹ The resource mobilization approach analyzes how political entrepreneurs marshal human and other resources for the purpose of promoting change in social structures, and studies which strategies make for success or failure in social movement organizations.² The political opportunity paradigm also focuses on resources, organization, and strategy, and additionally looks into characteristics of political systems and situations that facilitate or obstruct the attainment of social movement

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goals.³ Elements of both theoretical approaches have been implicitly or explicitly integrated by Jenkins and Lipsky.⁴ The writings of some theorists assume that social movements, though constituting a distinct form of collective action, may shade into institutional politics or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, revolution.⁵

This paper will summarize some of the central ideas of a combined resource mobilization-political opportunities paradigm. It will modify the concepts and extend the hypotheses as needed to help explain successful revolution in a contemporary Third World country, such as Nicaragua. It assumes the country is governed autocratically, that enough people who desire a change of regime have given up hope for peaceful methods, and thus constitute a revolutionary movement, one that will back a violent overthrow of the regime. For reasons that it is hoped will become clear later in the paper, it assumes further that the strongest organization within the revolutionary movement, the one which dominates the process of overthrowing the regime and ends up wielding the most power in the post-revolutionary government, is Marxist-Leninist. This was exactly the situation in Nicaragua in the 1970s, so a subsequent paper will test the principal hypotheses developed here in a case study of the Nicaraguan revolution.

More generally, a scenario that pits a traditional autocracy against Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries is fairly common in the Third World.⁶ At least one analyst expects this situation to continue as the Soviet Union, deprived of influence over its former satellites in Eastern Europe, shifts the focus of its aggressive foreign policy toward the Third World where it continues to find willing clients.⁷ With some modifications, the findings of this paper should shed light on the experience of other Third World countries where Marxist-Leninists, or followers of some other totalitarian ideology, are trying to foment violent revolution.

II

A Resource Mobilization-political Opportunities Paradigm of Revolution

FIVE FACTORS, or set of variables, which contribute to the violent overthrow of autocratic regimes are identified in a resource mobilization-political opportunities approach to the study of revolution. These are: (1) underlying conditions of discontent; (2) availability and growth of resources exploited by the revolutionaries; (3) ideology, organization, and strategies of the revolutionaries; (4) changes in the political opportunity structure; and (5) the dynamics of revolutionary processes.

Underlying conditions of discontent

This set of variables plays a secondary role in resource mobilization theory, not because grievances are unnecessary for political mobilization, but because

they are insufficient. Any society is plagued by a certain amount of discontent because of objective conditions of poverty, injustice, inequality, etc., or because of a subjective perception of such conditions. This discontent, however, needs to be harnessed and directed by organizers who have resources, if it is to serve as a motor for revolution. According to McCarthy and Zald, empirical work casts doubt on the traditional "assumption of a close link between preexisting discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena." Indeed, in their view, "deprivation and grievances" constitute a "weak" or "secondary component in the generation of social movements." They argue further that "grievances and discontent may be defined, *created*, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations."⁸

Grievances and discontent are not the cause of revolutions. If they were, most Third World countries would be in continuous turmoil: "The truly difficult problem, it would seem, is not to explain why revolutions happen spontaneously and inevitably (without calculated planning or direction), but rather to understand why revolutions happen hardly at all in a world that abounds with misery, deprivation, injustice, and spellbindingly rapid change."⁹ Viewed in this light, mass discontent is a passive, manipulative condition, something manufactured, as it were, by revolutionaries, but not an active cause of revolution. Thus, the "traditional perspective" is stood on its head, so to speak: Grievances are not what give rise to revolution, but rather, are important only to the extent that the rhetoric and actions of the revolutionaries themselves bring them into play.

Resources for revolution

As its name implies, resource mobilization theory emphasizes the wherewithal for starting, sustaining, and expanding social movement organizations. The resources that are needed range from manpower to money, from words of endorsement or encouragement from influential persons to weapons and other sinews of war. These resources are generated partly from within the population that is to be mobilized, and partly from without. It is assumed that the purpose of a social movement organization is to improve the conditions of existence of a population that is deprived in some way, socially, economically, or politically. Some of the resources needed by the social movement organization are raised from this population, as the incomes, education, skills, and self-confidence of its members rise over time. However, the deprived status of this group places limits on the quantity and quality of resources it can supply to the social movement organization. The remainder has to come from without, from elite groups and wealthy sympathizers, external to the deprived population, who look with favor on the purpose of the social movement organization, and who can use their influence in the media, universities, and even the government itself to help it achieve its goals.

The growth of a middle class is conducive to the development of social movements: "Middle strata . . . have shown a high level of volatility, movement action, and often variable or even unpredictable political behavior."¹⁰ Also contributing to the formation and growth of social movements are urbanization, which reduces the costs of communication and coordination, and expanding university enrollments, which raise expectations (along with skills and knowledge) of those aggrieved members of society who attend college.¹¹ The expansion of the college population makes an additional contribution to social movements: that of privileged youth with discretionary time who, motivated by idealism or ideology, are available for recruitment by social movement organizations.¹²

One of the major issues in resource mobilization theory concerns the origin of resources used by social movement organizations, namely, how much is generated from within the aggrieved group, and how much from without, from "conscience constituents" in the middle and upper classes. Some theorists stress the "crucial importance" for the attainment of social movement goals of outside contributors, wealthy or influential individuals who are not members of the deprived group but who nevertheless make available to the social movement organization various resources, including money, which are necessary for its success.¹³ However, in separate studies of the civil rights movement in the United States, McAdam and Morris found that external resources did not come into play until the movement was well under way.¹⁴

Whatever the exact division and timing between internal and external resources may be in Western social movements, there can be no doubt that external resources are critical in the success of a revolution. According to Garner and Zald:

Social movement analysis by sociologists has usually focused upon mobilization within a single nation-state. But it is important to emphasize that the leading issues of the sector may be defined across national borders, and that resources may flow across national borders. Social movement activity in one nation provides a template, a possibility for change to relevant groups in other nations. Not only the idea or model of change, but a flow of personnel, weapons, and resources may flow across national borders. It was true in the American revolution, in Allende's Chile, in the rash of movements of 1968, and in the "Green" movement of the 1980s.¹⁵

If this is true of social movements, it is even more so of Marxist-Leninist revolutions. "Internationalism" is a concept deeply embedded in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. Marx and Engels ended *The Communist Manifesto* with the famous exhortation: "Working men of all countries, unite!" Marx also celebrated the internationalism of the Paris Commune. He claimed that "the Commune annexed to France the working people [from] all over the world" and that it had "admitted all foreigners to the honour of dying for an immortal cause."¹⁶ Since, as the *Manifesto* proclaimed, the workers "have no country,"

Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organizations have incorporated into their ranks people of various nationalities. The first chief of Lenin's secret police, the Cheka, was a Pole. The Argentinean communist, Che Guevara, played a prominent role in the Cuban revolution before and shortly after the seizure of power. After a brief foray in Africa, Guevara tried to foment revolution in Bolivia, losing his life in the attempt. Since its earliest days, the Castro regime has sponsored revolutionary movements all over Latin America, eventually expanding into Africa. Today Cuba acts as Moscow's "cat's paw" in the Third World.¹⁷ It supplies Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries with training, weapons, and sanctuary.¹⁸ Marxist-Leninists also set up solidarity committees in the West, where they raise money and mount media campaigns to discredit native autocracies in the eyes of the world.

All the same, no Marxist-Leninist revolution can succeed without domestic resources: cadres, couriers, domestic currency, safe-houses, intelligence on government activities, sympathizers in high places, deserters from the military, popular or united fronts to confuse the public, lawyers for defending jailed revolutionaries, etc. As with social movements, an effective way to procure domestic resources is by appropriating them from existing institutions. Only in the case of a revolutionary organization, the means employed include what is usually regarded as criminal activity, viz., bank robberies, kidnapping wealthy persons and holding them for ransom, breaking into public or private arsenals to steal weapons, compelling a radio station to publish a communique, using universities and churches as sanctuaries for fugitives, and so on.

Ideology, organization, and strategy

Typically, a social movement gives birth to more than one organization, so that a certain amount of competition as well as cooperation takes place within a "social movement industry."¹⁹ Many theorists postulate that the more successful organizations, the ones that can mobilize the most resources, tend to be centralized, formally structured, and directed by a core of leaders ideologically committed to the goals of the social movement.²⁰

If ideologically-committed cadres and centralized organization are associated with success in social movements, the same can be said of revolutionary movements, only more emphatically. Indeed, the "evolution of revolutions," has been toward "the emergence of increasingly durable revolutionary organizations" combining ideology and weapons under centralized control.²¹

In the competition among organizations involved in the revolutionary "industry," Marxist-Leninists would seem to have a comparative advantage. They are imbued with a totalitarian ideology which legitimizes violence, and are bound together by Lenin's model of a centralized, conspiratorial party.²² For its adherents, Marxism-Leninism serves the function of religion, a secular faith

"pointing towards a better future which will arrive as a combined result of both the inexorable forces of history and the freely chosen effort of individuals who achieved the proper understanding of social forces."²³ Small in numbers, the strength of Marxist-Leninists lies in what Selznick calls "the organizational weapon," the ability to penetrate and manipulate established institutions and ad-hoc groups with strategically placed cadres whose ideological agenda is kept secret.²⁴ These qualities help Marxist-Leninists come out on top in the all-out struggle for power unleashed by revolution, a process which gives the edge to whatever organization is more able and willing to use violence without scruples.²⁵

With regard to strategy and tactics, resource mobilization theory emphasizes the value of disruption, manipulating the media, the activation of third parties, generating sympathy in bystander publics, and the winning of allies from among elites. Institutional life is disrupted by staging such things as sit-ins, walk-outs, mass demonstrations, strikes, riots, and attacks on the police and other agents of authority. Certain institutions, such as universities, are more susceptible to disruption than others, and thus are labeled "weak-link" institutions.²⁶

Media coverage increases the political impact of disruptions. Media-hyped events help attract recruits, demonstrate or create the illusion of strength of the movement, boost morale within the social movement organization, win sympathy from influential third parties and from bystander publics, and demoralize the authorities. Accordingly, journalists must be courted and events staged which appeal to their taste for the novel and the sensational.

It is absolutely essential for the success of a social movement organization that it obtain the support of third parties and secure allies from the elites. According to one theorist, "the essence of political protest consists of activating third parties to participate in controversy in ways favorable to protest goals."²⁷ An effective protest induces or maneuvers third parties into putting pressure on the government to settle with the protesters, if for no other reason than the latter's disruption is costly to them. Even more helpful is winning elite sponsorship or endorsement, for it can shield social movement organizers from repression.²⁸

Yet, the requirements for staging a protest and winning the support of third parties are often in conflict. On the one hand, in order to engage in calculated disruption, an organization needs to act cohesively. An effective way to rally its members behind an act of disruption that runs the risk of landing many of them in jail and getting some of them clubbed or even killed, is for the leaders to arouse their passions with militant and uncompromising rhetoric. However, this tactic can easily alienate third parties and elites whose sympathy and support the organization is hoping to attract. On the other hand, speaking softly so as to win elite friends and get public opinion on its side can cost the leadership

a loss of support from among the most militant members of the organization, the ones willing to take the most risks. It can also cause rifts within the leadership, between "moderates" and "radicals."

A way out of this dilemma is to engage in varying amounts of deception:

Failure to clarify meaning, or falsification, may increase protest effectiveness. Effective intragroup communication may increase the likelihood that protest constituents will "understand" that ambiguous or false public statements have "special meaning" and need not be taken seriously. The Machiavellian circle is complete when we observe that although lying may be prudent, the appearance of integrity and forthrightness is desirable for public relations, since these values are widely shared.²⁹

Strategic lying is also accomplished by dividing responsibility, so that different leaders specialize in communicating with different publics. A photogenic and charismatic member of the organization may be assigned the task of giving interviews to reporters, for example, while the less attractive, but perhaps more central, cadre leaders stay in the background until it is time for them to come to the fore.

The foregoing analysis of the uses of disruption and deception sheds light on the behavior of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. In their case, the disruptions are necessarily more violent and the lying is on a grander scale. The disruptions are more violent because Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, who aim at the destruction, not the reform, of the regime, carry out armed attacks on its military and police, kidnap or murder persons of wealth or authority, engage in hostage-taking, invade embassies, terrorize civilians, and enlist the cooperation of bystander publics through fear.³⁰ The lying is on a grander scale because, in order to win public sympathy and elite allies domestically, and in order to neutralize international actors who might be tempted to intervene on the side of the autocracy, such as the United States, Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries tone down their rhetoric during the last phases of a revolution, momentarily putting on a mask of moderation.³¹ This lying comes easy to Marxist-Leninists, who use words as political weapons, and for whom truth or consistency in public pronouncements as an end in itself amounts to, in Lenin's phrase, "philistine moralizing."³² Because it subscribes to an ideology of violent class struggle directed by a centralized vanguard party prepared to lie to further its aims as the situation requires, when it comes to revolution a Marxist-Leninist organization would seem to have an advantage over less ideological, less centralized, less violence-prone, and more scrupulous organizations.

Political opportunities

Social movement success or, at least, resource mobilization, is partly a function of the political environment and changes in that environment, i.e., of the structure of political opportunities. Regimes which are neither fully open, nor entirely

closed, or which are in the process of opening up, thus exhibiting both open and closed characteristics, are the most likely to be rocked by protests.³³ An exogenous change in the political order, at the domestic or international level, is conducive to mobilization.³⁴ For example, the election of a left-of-center government believed to be sympathetic to the goals of a social movement is a spur to domestic protest and other acts of resource mobilization. A change in the White House, from a conservative to a more liberal administration, can have similar effects in countries dependent on U.S. aid that are ruled autocratically. Additionally, cracks in the regime stimulate protest. Such divisions emerge whenever splits occur within the ruling coalition, or between the government and other elites, in the business or religious community. Still other significant changes which provoke protests are "sudden and major threats" to the interests or way of life of middle and upper-class sectors which "violate institutionalized conceptions of elite responsibilities."³⁵

The structure of political opportunities also plays a role in the success or failure of revolution, and in the acceleration or deceleration of revolutionary mobilization. The weakening of an autocratic regime presents opportunities to Marxist-Leninist (and, indeed, other) revolutionaries. An autocracy may become weaker by any combination of the following: aforementioned cracks in the regime; ill-health, old age, or death of the autocrat, with the latter event likely to precipitate a succession crisis; erosion of the repressive capabilities of the regime caused by absolute or relative decline in the number of military personnel, obsolescence of weapons, or relaxation of military discipline; corruption in the military and bureaucracy, with regime capabilities being betrayed for money, sexual favors, or some other type of bribe; and changes in the international environment, such as Washington's distancing itself from the regime.³⁶

Third-world autocracies (in which elections are rigged and the legislature, where it meets at all, is a rubber stamp) but which do not attempt to control all aspects of the economy and society, are subject to revolutionary fever the more Western ideas of democracy and freedom have penetrated the local culture through trade, travel, students returning from years of study in the West, and so on. It should be noted, though, that impulses to revolution within a country may come simultaneously from diametrically opposite ideological sources: from those who wish to model their country after Western examples, and from those who wish to rid their traditional society of Western influence. Thus, Western penetration of a Third World country ruled autocratically is doubly dangerous to the regime, since it gives rise to both democratic aspirations and to reactionary longings united only in their distaste for the half-open regime. Iran furnishes an example of this phenomenon.

Here again, Marxist-Leninists are particularly adept at exploiting simultaneously both Western and anti-Western sentiments within a revolutionary movement. It has been noted that "Lenin's genius is revealed in the way he used Western ideas to promote anti-Westernism."³⁷ To the pro-Western side Marxist-Leninists offer modernization and equality, while anti-imperialism is used to win over the anti-Western faction. A great deal of deception is involved in both cases, something that has already been noted.

Dynamics of revolution

It has been established that at various times and places social movement activity tends to bunch up, that "cycles of protest" occur. These cycles are often "touched off by unpredictable events, and are almost never under the control of a single 'center'" but "while organized groups are often taken by surprise by cycles of unrest, they quickly recoup their position and frequently adapt to the new formations created in the heat of the cycle."³⁸

While the spark that touches off a cycle is unpredictable in origin and timing, something is known about how the actions of the regime that is under attack contribute to the multiplication and escalation of protests. Ironically, the responsiveness of the regime to protests and demonstrations, and its unwillingness or inability to suppress them, tend to encourage them:

[T]he system which responds to protest is likely by its very responsiveness to encourage protest. . . . Protest . . . feeds on the responsiveness it succeeds in eliciting. System responsiveness is an opportunity in the sense that people are more likely to get what they want in responsive political systems than in unresponsive ones. Protest is more likely to flourish in relatively open systems where it elicits responses.³⁹

The dynamics of protest also operate in reverse, with repression against movement leaders serving to curtail protests.

As with protests, so with revolution: regime restraint in the face of a rising level of attacks can only encourage additional challenges, defiance, and renewed, and more intense assaults. The very existence of armed challengers with a revolutionary political program is an embarrassing affront to the rulers of any state. Failure to capture or destroy the rebels exposes the regime to ridicule and contempt, shatters the myth of invincibility upon which habitual obedience to autocracy to a large extent rests, and encourages more people to take up arms against it or call for the overthrow or dissolution of the government.

Like everyone else, Marxist-Leninists can be taken by surprise when a formerly quiescent movement is suddenly galvanized into revolutionary action by an unforeseen stimulus. At such a moment, the self-proclaimed "vanguard" finds itself in the rear or in the sidelines, in danger of being left behind or reduced to political irrelevance by the rush of events and changing circumstances. However, better than most other revolutionaries, Marxist-Leninists are taught to cap-

italize on regime disintegration.⁴⁰ While there is no guarantee that an upsurge of revolutionary activity feeding on a collapsing regime will bring Marxist-Leninists to power, they are better conditioned than most to ride the wave of uprisings to victory. Not for nothing are they frequently accused of "stealing" a revolution. This charge was leveled against the Sandinistas, who during the Nicaraguan revolution captured control of the new government, and for the next decade went about implementing their Marxist-Leninist agenda in defiance of domestic resistance, both civil and armed, and opposition from the United States.⁴¹

Notes

1. S. Tarrow, "National Politics and Collective Action. Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the U.S.," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 14, 1988, 421-440.
2. J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82, 1977, 1212-1241.
3. S. Tarrow, *Struggling to Reform. Social Movements and Policy Change During Cycles of Protest*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Western Societies Program, Occasional Paper No. 15, 1983; P. K. Eisenger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 67, 1973, 11-28.
4. J. C. Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9, 1983, 527-553; M. Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, 62, 1968, 1144-1158.
5. J. C. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, discusses the shading of social movements into institutional politics, while continuities with revolution are stressed by C. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading MA: Addison-Wesley 1978.
6. N. Leites and C. Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority*, Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970.
7. C. Fairbanks, Jr., "Gorbachev's Global Doughnut," *The National Interest*, 19, Spring 1990, 21-33. Professor Fairbanks argues that the Soviet Union appears to be following a pattern traced by previous ideological empires, which has been "to rot at the core but remain vital at the periphery." Thus, while the appeals of Marxism-Leninism are spent in Europe, this is by no means the case in the Third World: "The winter of 1989-90 displayed a vivid contrast in morale: in El Salvador, guerrillas spent their lives for communism in suicidal attacks; in Berlin and Prague, the leaders would not defend communism even to save themselves." See *Ibid.*, 22, 30.
8. J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, *op. cit.*, 1214-1215. Emphasis added.
9. J. deNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 17-18.
10. R. A. Garner and M. N. Zald, "The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors," in *The Challenge of Social Control: Citizenship and Institution Building in Modern Society*, G. D. Suttles and M. N. Zald, eds., Norwood: Ablex, 1985, 300.
11. J. C. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, 532, writes that, in the United States, "the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1950s stemmed from the urbanization of the southern black population, increased numbers of middle-class and working-class blacks, growing black college enrollments, and the organizational expansion of black churches."
12. J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, "The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization," Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973, 10-11.
13. J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," *op. cit.*, 1216, 1225.

14. D. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982; A. D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. Black Communities Organizing for Change*, New York: The Free Press, 1984.
15. R. A. Garner and M. N. Zald, *op. cit.*, 302-303. Emphasis added. Although they occurred in Europe, and they were peaceful, the anti-Communist revolutions of 1989 in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (in Romania it was violent) also profited from external resources, not least information and messages of hope beamed into these countries by Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. Asked whether these stations had helped in the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Lech Walesa replied, "Ladies and gentlemen, the degree cannot even be described. Would there be earth without sun?" Similarly, Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia told the VOA staff in Washington, D.C.: "You have informed us truthfully of events around the world and in our country as well, and in this way you helped to bring about the peaceful revolution which has at long last taken place." See *Insight* magazine, March 26, 1990, 28.
16. K. Marx and V. I. Lenin, *The Civil War in France: The Paris Commune. The complete edition of Marx's three addresses on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the Commune, and Lenin's writings on the Commune*, New York: International Publishers, 1968, 65.
17. This metaphor was suggested by Will Lissner.
18. A. W. Knight, *The K. G. B. Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, Boston: Allen E. Unwin, Inc., 1988, 285.
19. J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," *op. cit.*, 1219.
20. J. C. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, 539-542.
21. J. DeNardo, *op. cit.*, 21.
22. See N. Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, Glencoe: IL: The Free Press, 1953, and C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
23. P. Hollander, *The Survival of the Adversary Culture*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, 157.
24. P. Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960.
25. N. Leites and C. Wolf, Jr., *op. cit.* According to one historian of the Russian revolution, it was Lenin's lack of scruples which enabled the Bolsheviks to defeat the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks in the civil war. See L. Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
26. R. A. Garner and M. N. Zald, *op. cit.*, 297.
27. M. Lipsky, *op. cit.*, 1153.
28. C. Tilly, *op. cit.*
29. M. Lipsky, *op. cit.*, 1153.
30. E. Halperin, "Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and the Reality of Guerrilla Warfare," in *Violence and the Latin American Revolutionaries*, M. Radu, ed., New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988.
31. D. W. Payne, "The 'Mantos' of Sandinista Deception," *Strategic Review*, 13, 1985, 9-20.
32. N. Leites, *op. cit.*, 119.
33. P. K. Eisenger, *op. cit.*
34. S. Tarrow, *Struggling to Reform*, 39.
35. J. C. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, 531.

36. Ironically, the anti-communist revolutions of Eastern Europe were probably triggered by Moscow's distancing itself from the "partocracies" it had put and kept in power for more than forty years. The liberalizing changes Gorbachev introduced in the Soviet Union created political opportunities in the satellite states which culminated in the sweeping away of communist dictatorships from Berlin to Bucharest.

37. R. Wesson, *Communism and Communist Systems*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978, 34.

38. S. Tarrow, *Struggling to Reform*, 38.

39. P. K. Eisenger, *op. cit.*, 27-28.

40. V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, New York: International Publishers, 1969.

41. On February 25, 1990, the first fully contested and internationally supervised election since the 1979 revolution was held in Nicaragua. At stake were the presidency, the national assembly, and local governments throughout the country. The result was a victory for a multi-party coalition opposed to the Sandinistas, the UNO, which won 55 percent of the vote. The Sandinistas polled only 41 percent. UNO was supported by the armed Nicaraguan Resistance (the Contras), as well as the United States and the President of Venezuela. Many UNO figures, including its presidential candidate, Violeta Chamorro, had been active in the 1979 revolution.

Announcements:

The ISCSC

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY for the Comparative Study of Civilizations is calling for papers related to several selected themes in connection with its May 30-June 2, 1991 annual meeting in Santo Domingo. Information is available from Professor Elpidio Laguna-Díaz, Re ISCSC, Rutgers University, Conklin Hall, 175 University Ave., Newark, NJ 07102. Telephone (201)648-5498.

International Conference on Michael Polanyi

ANOTHER CALL for papers is in connection with the International Conference on Michael Polanyi (in celebration of the 100th anniversary of his birth) at Kent State University in Ohio on April 11-13, 1991. Information is available from Dr. Raymond E. Wilken, Kent State University, College of Education, 405 White Hall, Kent, OH 44242 USA. Telephone (216)672-2294.

